Distributionally Robust Pricing in Independent Private Value Auctions by Suzdaltsev, Alex
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
01
61
8v
1 
 [e
co
n.T
H]
  4
 A
ug
 20
20
Distributionally Robust Pricing In Independent
Private Value Auctions
Alex Suzdaltsev
Higher School of Economics
asuzdaltsev@gmail.com
August 5, 2020
Abstract
A seller chooses a reserve price in a second-price auction to maximize worst-case
expected revenue when she knows only the mean of value distribution and an upper
bound on either values themselves or variance. Values are private and iid. We
prove that it is always optimal to set the reserve price to seller’s own valuation.
However, the maxmin reserve price may not be unique. If the number of bidders
is sufficiently high, all prices below the seller’s valuation, including zero, are also
optimal. A second-price auction with the reserve equal to seller’s value (or zero)
is an asymptotically optimal mechanism (among all mechanisms) as the number of
bidders grows without bound.
Keywords: Robust Mechanism Design, Auctions, Moments problems
This paper benefited from comments from (in random order) Michael Ostrovsky, Andy
Skrzypacz, Dmitry Arkhangelsky, Jeremy Bulow, Robert Wilson, Gabriel Carroll, Ilya Segal,
Evgeny Drynkin, and audience members at 2017 Conference on Economic Design, York, UK.
1 Introduction
Classic auction theory derives revenue-maximizing reserve prices under the assumption of
known distribution of bidders’ values. One may give two interpretations to this assump-
tion: (i) the probability distribution is objectively known to the seller; (ii) the distribution
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represents her beliefs. Under any of these interpretations, the usual assumption can be
problematic: (i) may not hold in practice, especially in the case of new goods; and (ii) con-
tradicts empirical evidence showing that humans do not act as Bayesian decision-makers
(Ellsberg, 1961).
In this paper, we propose an analysis of a simple textbook auction environment with
one tweak: assume that the seller, instead of knowing the distribution of bidders’ values,
knows less, and evaluates the residual uncertainty over the distributions using worst-case
criterion. What would be the optimal reserve price?
We assume that bidders’ private valuations are known to be independent draws from
some unknown distribution F . We then consider two specifications of the seller’s infor-
mation: (1) the seller knows the mean of F and an upper bound on values; (2) she knows
the mean of F and an upper bound on its variance. One may justify this approach in
various ways:
• It may be easier for the seller to make an educated guess about two numbers than
about a whole distribution.
• It may be easier for the seller to estimate statistically a small number of parame-
ters than a whole distribution. In particular, nonparametric estimators of density
functions converge more slowly than parametric estimators of the distribution’s mo-
ments.
• As shown by Wolitzky (2016), a model of a seller who knows only the mean of value
distribution and bounds on its support can arise from seller’s uncertainty about
bidders’ information structures1.
The question of which reserve price is maxmin may be interesting not only from a
normative, but from a positive perspective. Empirical literature on reserve prices in auc-
tions2 yields what Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2016) call a “reserve price puzzle”: the reserve
prices observed in auctions are typically substantially lower than reserve prices optimal
under the estimated distributions of values. The very formulation of the puzzle suggests
that its possible explanation involves postulating that the sellers do not possess estimates
produced by econometric studies. This lack of distributional information, coupled with
1In particular, bidder’s posterior mean can follow any distribution F with mean m and support in
[0, v] if the prior value distribution is a binary distribution on {0, v} with mean m. To apply this in
our setting where values are known to be iid, we must assume that bidders information structures are
identical.
2See, e.g., McAfee and Vincent (1992); Paarsch (1997); McAfee et al. (2002); Haile and Tamer (2003).
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a worst-case perspective employed by a seller could intuitively explain the fact the ob-
served reserve prices are low. Indeed, as a function of the reserve price, the expected
revenue under a fixed distribution is typically relatively flat to the left of the optimum
and declines sharply to the right of the optimum, so the losses when overshooting the
unknown optimal reserve are substantial while the losses when undershooting are minor
(see Figure 1). This suggests that a cautious seller may want to employ a low reserve.
r
R
r∗
Figure 1: A typical plot of expected revenue as a function of reserve price. (The plot
shown is for vi ∼ U [0, 1] and n = 3.)
The main results of this paper state exactly this: a seller maximizing the worst-case
expected revenue cannot do better than to set the reserve price to her own valuation. This
is true in both settings we consider. The “low reserves under ambiguity” phenomenon
is an emerging theme in the literature (see section 1.1 for details); our setting is, to the
best of our knowledge, the first one in which the optimal reserve price is low for any fixed
number of bidders n ≥ 2.
However, the optimal reserve price in our setting may be non-unique. Suppose c is the
seller’s valuation. When the number of bidders is sufficiently high, or c is sufficiently low,
there is a whole interval of optimal prices that includes all prices in [0, c] (and possibly some
higher prices). This is compatible with empirical evidence: the reserve prices observed
in practice are frequently not just low, but are lower than all plausible seller’s valuations
(Hasker and Sickles, 2010). Explanations for this fact proposed in the literature include
boundedly rational bidders who do not fully understand how participation rate depends
on the reserve price while sorting among competing sellers (Jehiel and Lamy, 2015) and a
combination of value interdependence and bidders’ risk aversion (Hu et al., 2019). Even
though all reserve prices below c are weakly dominated by c in our model (i.e., they
yield a weakly lower revenue than c for any fixed distribution of values), their worst-case
optimality provides an additional (weak) explanation for why such prices may be observed
in practice.
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Solving the maxmin problems posed in this paper directly by backward induction is,
to the best of our knowledge, hard. So we employ an indirect proof technique. In the first
step, using a Lagrangian approach we identify a worst-case distribution F ∗ if the reserve
price is equal to seller’s valuation, r = c (this is easier than for other prices). F ∗ is a binary
distribution in the first setting (mean and upper bound on values are known) but has a
continuous part in the second setting (mean and upper bound on variance are known).
We use an analogy of Nature’s problem to a textbook profit maximization problem by
a competitive firm with nonconvex costs to minimize the Lagrangian pointwise. Denote
the worst-case revenue under r = c by R∗. In the second step, for each price r ≥ 0 we
identify a specific distribution Fˆr such that if the reserve price is r and the distribution
is Fˆr, the seller’s revenue is not more than R
∗. This implies that r = c is a maxmin
price. Note that the distributions Fˆr need not be worst-case for respective prices. They
are only bad enough to discourage the seller from choosing r = c, but not necessarily the
worst. We find appropriate to call them threat distributions – those Nature may threaten
to use to harm the seller if she deviates from r = c. This proof technique is similar to one
used by He and Li (2020), who find a maxmin reserve price when marginal distribution
of values, but not their joint distribution, are known (but, of course, the construction of
Fˆr is substantially different, as the set of possible distributions is very different from that
in He and Li (2020)).
Sometimes (when the number of bidders is small or c is high) Nature’s threats are
strong enough so that r = c is the unique maxmin price; when the number of bidders
is larger or c is small, other prices, including zero (as noted above), may be maxmin.
This indifference occurs because in this case the lowest point in support of F ∗ happens
to be strictly higher than c and the worst-case distribution is still F ∗ for all r ≤ c. That
is, it may be so that under the worst-case distribution sale always happens, and always
happens at a price higher than both the seller’s valuation and the reserve price, even when
both are positive.
In this paper, we address the question of optimal reserve price, but not a more general
question of optimal mechanism for a fixed n. A technical difficulty that does not allow to
use a duality approach, as in Suzdaltsev (2020) (see literature review below), is that the
set of joint distributions of values feasible for Nature is not convex due to the independence
constraint (and these constraints are nonlinear). However, we show that the second-price
auction without a reserve (or a reserve equal to seller’s valuation) is an asymptotically
maxmin mechanism as n grows without bound. This follows from the fact that the
revenue guarantee of any mechanism cannot be higher than the known mean of value
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distribution, but the revenue guarantee of the second-price auction with a maxmin price
converges to this mean as n grows. We compare the rates of this convergence across
different settings to obtain insights about the relative “strength” of Nature depending on
the set of distributions available to it.
The result that a simple auction is asymptotically optimal must be reconciled with
results in Segal (2003) who shows that when agents’ values are independent draws from an
unknown distribution, “bootstrap” schemes that estimate the distribution from bidder’s
reports and set individual prices based on estimates derived from other agents’ reports, can
asymptotically extract the entire full-distributional-information revenue. These schemes
differ substantially from a classic second-price auction. The apparent discrepancy between
the our asymptotic result and Segal’s is due to the fact that optimization criteria are
different: while we employ the maxmin criterion, approximating the full-distributional-
information outcome is about minimizing regret. When Nature chooses a distribution to
minimize revenue itself rather than to maximize losses relative to full information, the
“bootstrap” schemes are not likely to be significantly superior to the simple auction.
1.1 Related literature
This paper contributes to the growing literature on robust mechanism design. The closest
contributions to ours are Carrasco et al. (2018a), He and Li (2020), Koc¸yig˘it et al. (2020),
Suzdaltsev (2020), Che (2019) and Neeman (2003). Carrasco et al. (2018a) study the
problem of selling the good to a single agent by seller who maximizes worst-case expected
revenue while knowing the first N moments of distribution. They also characterize the
optimal randomized mechanism, and the optimal deterministic posted price for the case
when a mean and upper bound on values is known, as in setting 1 of this paper. He and Li
(2020) characterize the optimal deterministic in a second-price auction when the seller
knows the marginal distribution of values but not their joint distribution. This setting
may be seen as complementary to ours, as we assume that the marginal distribution
is unknown, but a particular correlation structure (independence) is known. He and Li
(2020) show that a second-price auction with no reserve is asymptotically optimal among
all mechanisms, as in the present paper. Their proof technique is partially similar to ours.
Koc¸yig˘it et al. (2020) find, among other results, the optimal deterministic reserve price
when the seller knows a lower bound for the mean of values, an upper bound for values
and there is no restriction on values’ correlation structure. Suzdaltsev (2020) uses strong
duality to find an optimal deterministic mechanism for a similar set of distributions where
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the known means can be heterogeneous. This mechanism happens to be a linear version
of the Myersonian optimal auction. Che (2019) finds an optimal randomized reserve price
in a second-price auction for the same set of distributions. An early precursor to this
literature, Neeman (2003) finds the optimal reserve price in a second-price auction where
the set of distributions is the same as in Koc¸yig˘it et al. (2020), but the criterion is the
worst-case ratio of expected revenue to expected full surplus, rather than expected revenue
itself.
Some of the above papers indeed find that with sufficiently many bidders, the robustly
optimal reserve price is low. In He and Li (2020) and Che (2019), the optimal reserve
price converges to seller’s value as number of bidders goes to infinity; in Koc¸yig˘it et al.
(2020) and Suzdaltsev (2020), the optimal reserve is equal to seller’s value starting from a
certain number of bidders. In contrast, in the present paper it is equal to seller’s value for
all n ≥ 2 In this sense, the present paper’s setting yields the most striking result among
the existing ones.
Azar et al. (2013) find a robustly optimal price for a single agent (or for each of
many agents when there is an infinite supply of the good) when the seller knows mean
and variance of the value distribution. Other papers seeking robustness to type distri-
butions include Carrasco et al. (2018b), Auster (2018), Bergemann and Schlag (2011),
Bergemann and Schlag (2008). Carroll (2017), Giannakopoulos et al. (2019), Chen et al.
(2019) tackle the problem of selling multiple goods to a single agent under unknown type
distribution. Bose et al. (2006) and Wolitzky (2016) study mechanism design when agents
themselves are maxmin with respect to the distribution of other agents’ types. Wolitzky
(2016) uses a specification of sets of possible distributions similar to ours: bounds on
support and the mean are known. He gives a microfoundation for this specification which
we mentioned earlier.
A separate strand of literature studies mechanisms robust to misspecification of agents’
information structures, rather than the designer’s prior. Brooks and Du (2019) identify
an optimal mechanism in the common value setting, while Du (2018) identifies a simpler
mechanism that asymptotically extracts full surplus. In the final section of their paper,
Bergemann et al. (2017) briefly consider an example in which they find the optimal reserve
price in a first-price auction robust to misspecification of agents’ information structures.
Others kinds of robustness explored in the literature include robustness to technol-
ogy or preferences, robustness to strategic behavior and robustness to interaction among
agents and are surveyed by Carroll (2018).
Finally, this paper is related to the literature seeking to explain low reserve prices
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observed in real-life auctions. Levin and Smith (1994) show that it may be optimal
to use a reserve price equal to seller’s valuation under endogenous costly entry while
Levin and Smith (1996) show that unlike the textbook IPV case, the optimal reserve con-
verges to the seller’s valuation when values are private but are only conditionally iid. As
mentioned above, Jehiel and Lamy (2015) and Hu et al. (2019) give alternative explana-
tions for why observed reserve prices are sometimes lower than the seller’s valuation.
1.2 Organization of the paper
In section 2, we describe the set-up. In section 3, we state and prove the results for the
case of known mean and an upper bound on values; in section 4 we do the same for the case
of known mean and an upper bound on variance. In section 5, we show that second-price
auction without a reserve is an asymptotically optimal mechanism among all mechanisms
and compare rates of convergence of the maxmin revenue to its asymptotic value (which
is simply the mean value distribution) for different settings. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Consider the standard second-price auction with one object for sale and n ≥ 2 bidders
(for an extension to first-price auctions, see section 6). The valuations of the bidders are
iid with some distribution F , but F is not fully known to the seller. We consider two
specifications of seller’s information. In the first one, the seller knows that E(vi) = m > 0
and that vi ∈ [0, v], where v > m. In the second specification, the seller knows that vi ≥ 0,
E(vi) = m > 0 and that V ar(vi) ≤ σ2. The variance constraint is specified as inequality,
rather than equality due to reasons discussed in Carrasco et al. (2018a) – with an equality
constraint for the highest moment, the set of distributions may not be compact; also, the
proof is somewhat easier to state. However, when variance is known exactly, the results
are the same (see section 6).
No further restrictions on F are made. In particular, atoms in F are allowed and F
is not necessarily regular in the Myerson sense. Denote the set of feasible distributions if
only mean and upper bound on values is known by ∆1(m, v) and if both mean and upper
bound on variance are known by ∆2(m, σ
2).
The seller’s own valuation for the object, c, may be higher than bidders’ values. We
assume that c ∈ [0, m). One reason for not normalizing c to zero is that we would like to
distinguish between a reserve price equal to c and zero reserve price. More generally, we
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would like to allow distributions that put mass below c.
The seller wishes to set a deterministic, public reserve price that maximizes revenue.
Denote the expected revenue (including the seller’s valuation c) if the distribution of
values is F and the reserve price is r by R(F, r). We consider the following problem:
sup
r≥0
inf
F∈∆
R(F, r), (1)
where either ∆ = ∆1(v,m) or ∆ = ∆2(m, σ
2). In other words, the seller wishes to set
a price in such a way that the worst-case guarantee of revenue given her information is
maximal. Denote by R(r) the value of the infimum in (1), i.e. the value of this guarantee.
We call any price r that solves (1) a maxmin reserve price; we call the corresponding
expected revenue R∗ the maxmin revenue.
To present the analysis of the above problem, it will be convenient to us to phrase it as
a zero-sum Stackelberg game between the seller and adversarial Nature in which the seller
moves first by setting a price r and then Nature, upon seeing r, chooses a distribution F
from the choice set ∆.
Denote by F (v) the cdf of the distribution F and by v(i) the ith-highest component
of the vector of valuations v. Then, assuming the bidders play dominant strategies, the
function R(F, r) is given by
R(F, r) = c · P (v(1) ≤ r) + r · P (v(1) > r ∩ v(2) ≤ r) + EF∼F∼···∼F
[
v(2) · 1{v(2)>r}
]
=
r − (r − c)F n(r) +
∫ ∞
r
(
1− nF n−1(v) + (n− 1)F n(v)) dv, (2)
where we used an expression relating the cdf of second-order statistic to the cdf of the
parent distribution F and the identity E(X) =
∫ +∞
0
(1−F (v))dv for a nonnegative random
variable X with cdf F .
Expressing the expected revenue in terms of the cdf F (v) allows to simultaneously cover
all distributions regardless of presence of atoms, and also allows to reduce optimization
over distributions to optimization over functions.
8
3 Known mean and upper bound on values
3.1 The result
Consider the problem (1) with ∆ = ∆(m, v). Among other results, Carrasco et al. (2018a)
solve this problem for n = 1, i.e., solve the monopolistic pricing problem. They show that
there exists a unique maxmin price that exceeds seller’s costs.
In contrast, a main result of this paper is when there are at least two bidders, a reserve
price equal to seller’s opportunity costs c is maxmin.
A main contribution of this paper is the following result:
Theorem 1 (Main result I). Suppose the seller knows the mean of value distribution m
and an upper bound on values v. Then, the set of prices r∗ solving problem (1) includes
seller’s valuation c.
3.2 The proof
In this section, we provide the proof of theorem 1. The plan of attack, as outlined
in the introduction, consists of two steps. In the first step, we identify the worst-case
distribution F ∗ when r = c using a Lagrangian method. In the second step, for any r ≥ 0
we specify a distribution Fˆr such that R(Fˆr, r) ≤ R(F ∗, c), without making any claim that
Fˆr is worst-case. This approach allows to circumvent the need to solve for a worst-case
distribution for each r. Identifying a worst-case distribution for r = c is much simpler
than for other prices because the term −(r − c)F n(r) in (2) disappears when r = c, so
that the expected revenue depends on F only though an integral. In the previous version
of this paper, (Suzdaltsev, 2018), we do identify worst-case distributions for each r ≥ 0
but this requires, at a point, tedious second-order analysis and works only for the case of
a bound on values, but not a bound on variance.
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3.2.1 First step
Suppose r = c. Then, Nature’s problem, as a problem of choosing a function F (v), may
be written as
min
F (·)
(
c+
∫ v
c
(
1− nF n−1(v) + (n− 1)F n(v)) dv) (3)
s.t.
∫ v
0
(1− F (v))dv = m (4)
F (v) ∈ [0, 1] for all v ∈ [0, v] (5)
F (v) is nondecreasing (6)
F (v) is right-continuous (7)
The constraint (4) is the mean constraint, while the constraints (5)-(7) are necessary and
sufficient to ensure that the function F (·) chosen by Nature is a cdf. The constraint (7) is
not an issue; the monotonicity constraint may a priori be an issue, but, fortunately, turns
out not to be.
To solve the problem (3)-(7), we first prove that it is without loss of generality to look
at distributions putting no mass below c. This allows to make the integration bounds in
the objective (3) and the constraint (4) the same.
Lemma 1. For every feasible cdf F in problem (3)-(7), there exists a feasible cdf F˜ putting
no mass below c such that the expected revenue (3) is weakly lower under F˜ than under
F .
Proof of lemma 1: Take a feasible cdf F . Define β := (m − c)/ ∫∞
c
(1 − F (v))dv.
Because F is feasible, β ∈ (0, 1]. Then consider
F˜ (v) :=

0, v < cβF (v) + (1− β), v ≥ c.
By construction,
∫∞
0
(1 − F˜ (v))dv = m so F˜ is feasible and puts no mass below c. The
revenue is weakly lower under F˜ than under F because F˜ (v) ≥ F (v) for all v ≥ c and the
integrand in (3) is decreasing in F . 
The intuition behind lemma 1 is straightforward. Suppose there is some probability
mass strictly below r = c. By transferring it all to r = c Nature will not change the
expected revenue, but will increase the mean of the distribution. Then it can restore the
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mean by redistributing mass within the set {v : v ≥ c} towards lower values which will
reduce the revenue.
In light of lemma 1, the mean constraint can be now rewritten as
∫ v
c
(1− F (v))dv = m− c (8)
This allows to proceed to forming a Lagrangian.
Define the Lagrangian by
L(F, λ) :=
∫ v
c
(
1− nF n−1(v) + (n− 1)F n(v) + λ(1− F (v))) dv (9)
In what follows, we will minimize the Lagrangian pointwise. The validity of the La-
grangian approach rests on the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Suppose F0 is a cdf that minimizes the Lagrangian among all cdfs for some
λ ∈ R and satisfies (8). Then, F0 solves the problem (3).
Proof: Take F0 and any other cdf F˜ satisfying (8) (which is without loss of generality
by lemma 1). Because F0 minimizes the Lagrangian, we have
L(F0, λ) ≤ L(F˜ , λ).
Because both F0 and F˜ satisfy (8),
−λ
∫ v
c
(1− F0(v))dv = −λ
∫ v
c
(1− F˜ (v))dv.
Summing the above relations, one gets that R(F0, c) ≤ R(F˜ , c), as desired. 
Call the integrand in (9) −H(F, λ)3. The first-order condition for the maximization
of H with respect to F is
λ = n(n− 1)F n−2(F − 1). (10)
If n = 2, this equation has the unique solution, so the optimal F is a constant which
corresponds to a binary distribution on {c, v}. For n ≥ 3, however, H(F, λ) is not concave
3The notation stems from the fact that the integrand is equal to the Hamiltonian of the corresponding
optimal control problem. The Maximum Principle (as applied to the relaxed problem) guarantees the
existence of the Lagrange multiplier λ such that the optimal F maximizes the Lagrangian pointwise.
However, in the formal proof we construct the multiplier explicitly and therefore do not have to rely on
Maximum Principle.
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in F . In fact, for n ≥ 3, Nature’s problem is isomorphic to a textbook profit maximization
problem of a competitive firm with U-shaped marginal and average costs functions that
chooses its “output” F given the “price” λ. (The corresponding “total cost function”
is TC(F ) = (n − 1)F n − nF n−1.) If the price is below the minimum of average costs
(minAC), the optimal output is zero; if the price is above minAC, the optimal output
is given by the minimum of the larger solution to (10) and 1; and if the price is exactly
equal to minAC, both zero output and the output minimizing the AC are optimal.
Define q∗n := 1− 1(n−1)2 . This is the “output” minimizing “average costs”. Define also
z(y) := yn−1 − yn−2.
The “supply curve” stemming from the pointwise minimization of the Lagrangian (max-
imization of H) is stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 3.
arg max
F∈[0,1]
H(F, λ) =


{0}, λ < λ∗;
{0, q∗n} , λ = λ∗;
{min{y¯(λ), 1}}, λ > λ∗,
(11)
where y¯(λ) is the larger solution to (10) and
λ∗ = min
y∈[0,1]
[
(n− 1)yn − nyn−1
y
]
= n(n− 1)z(q∗n). (12)
λ∗ is “minAC” (see Figure 2 for the case n = 3).
]
F
λ
“MC”
“AC”
λ∗
q∗3 = 0.75
Figure 2: The pointwise minimization of the Lagrangian for n = 3 (the argmin correspon-
dence is in red).
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Fortunately, a value of λ can always be found such that F (v) maximizes H(F, λ) for all
v ∈ [c, v] and the mean constraint is satisfied. This leads to the identification of worst-case
distributions. Define
v∗ :=

0, n = 2;max{m− v−m
(n−1)2−1
, 0
}
n ≥ 3.
Denote by δa,b a binary distribution with support {a, b} and mean m. Note that if
v∗ > 0, the distribution δv∗,v puts a probability of q
∗
n on v
∗.
Proposition 1. Suppose r = c. Then the distribution δmax{v∗,c},v solves problem (3)-(7).
Proof of proposition 1: Suppose c > v∗. This is equivalent to (n − 1)2 < v−c
m−c
.
The binary distribution on {c, v} is described by a cdf F ∗(v) = v−m
v−c
for all v ∈ [c, v).
Denote p = v−m
v−c
. Consider λ0 = n(n−1)z(p). Because (n−1)2 < v−cm−c , p > q∗n so λ0 > λ∗.
Thus, by lemma 3, F ∗ minimizes the Lagrangian for λ = λ0. By lemma 2, F
∗ solves the
problem (3)-(7).
Now suppose c ≤ v∗, i.e. (n − 1)2 ≥ v−c
m−c
. The binary distribution on {v∗, v} is such
that its cdf F ∗ takes values 0 and q∗n on [c, v). Consider λ0 = λ
∗. Thus, by lemma 3, F ∗
minimizes the Lagrangian for λ = λ0. By lemma 2, F
∗ solves the problem (3)-(7). 
It is instructive to consider a specific numeric example. Note that if c = 0, Nature’s
problem for r = c is one of finding a distribution minimizing the expectation of second-
order statistic in a sample given the known mean and upper bound.
Example 1. Suppose n = 3, v = 1 and m = 1/2, and r = c = 0. Then, under the
worst-case distribution the valuation of each bidder is equal to 1/3 with probability 3/4
and is equal to 1 with probability 1/4. The worst-case expected revenue is equal to 7/16.
As noted in the introduction, the fact that the support of the worst-case distribution
may be bounded away from c is a reason for why the maxmin reserve price may not be
unique.
3.2.2 Second step
In this step, for every r we construct a feasible distribution Fˆr such that R(Fˆr, r) ≤ R(c)
for all r. This implies the result of theorem 1. The distributions Fˆr are not necessarily
worst-case given a reserve r. They may be thought of as threat distributions : distributions
that Nature threatens to use were the seller to deviate from r = c.
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rR
c mv∗
A
r
R
c mv∗
A
Figure 3: Proof idea. The curves are graphs of R(Fˆr, r). The graph of the worst-case
revenue function R(r) must lie everywhere weakly below the depicted curve by Step 2
and must pass through point A by Step 1. n = 3; v = 1, m = 1/2. In the left picture,
c = 0.4 > 1/3 = v∗; cmust be the unique maxmin price. On the right, c = 0.2 < 1/3 = v∗;
c may not be uniquely optimal.
The construction depends on whether c > v∗ or c ≤ v∗.
Case 1. c > v∗. The construction of Fˆr is separate for r ∈ [0, v∗), r ∈ [v∗, c),
r ∈ [c,m), r ≥ m. Define threat distributions Fˆr by
Fˆr :=


δv∗,v, r ∈ [0, v∗);
δr+,v, r ∈ [v∗, c);
δr,v, r ∈ [c,m);
δm, r ≥ m,
where r+ is a point arbitrarily close to r to the right of it. (Formally, in this case we
consider a sequence of distributions Fˆ kr , each of those binary on {r + 1/k, v}.)
Proposition 2. Suppose c > v∗. Then, R(Fˆr, r) < R(c) for all r 6= c and R(Fˆr, r) = R(c)
for r = c.
Proof: The fact that R(Fˆr, r) = R(c) for r = c is obvious since Fˆc is a worst-case
distribution for r = c, as identified by proposition 1.
Consider r ∈ [c,m). Denote by p(r) = v−m
v−r
the probability assigned by Fˆr to r. Then,
by (2),
R(Fˆr, r) = r − (r − c)pn(r) + (v − r)(1− npn−1(r) + (n− 1)pn(r)).
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Thus, the full derivative of revenue is
dR(Fˆr, r)
dr
= npn−1 − npn − npn−1p′ + (v − r)n(n− 1)z(p)p′.
Since p′(v − r) = p, this simplifies to
n(n− 2)pz(p)− npn−1p′ · (r − c).
Because p′ > 0 ,dR(Fˆr ,r)
dr
< 0 except when r = c and n = 2. Thus, R(Fˆr, r) is strictly
decreasing on [c,m), which implies the result.
For r ≥ m, R(Fˆr, r) = c, but c = lim
r→m−
R(Fˆr, r). Thus, c < R(c).
Consider now r ∈ [v∗, c). Denote by δr,v the binary distribution on {r, v}. R(δr+,v, r)
differs from R(δr,v, r) only by term (r − c)pn, because there is a sale if v(1) = r+ but not
if v(1) = r. Thus, when r ∈ [v∗, c), we get
dR(Fˆr, r)
dr
= n(n− 2)pz(p)− npn−1p′ · (r− c) + [(r − c)pn]′ = pn−1((n− 1)2p− n(n− 2)).
For r > v∗, p(r) > q∗n, and for r = v
∗, p(r) = q∗n. Thus, the above derivative is zero at
r = v∗ and positive at r ∈ (v∗, c). Thus, R(Fˆr, r) is strictly increasing on [v∗, c), which
implies the result.
Finally, because R(Fˆr, r) < R(c) for r = v
∗, this is true for r < v∗ as well. 
Case 2. c ≤ v∗. Define threat distributions Fˆr by
Fˆr :=


δv∗,v, r ∈ [0, v∗);
δr,v, r ∈ [v∗, m);
δm, r ≥ m,
Proposition 3. Suppose c ≤ v∗. Then, R(Fˆr, r) ≤ R(c) for all r 6= c and R(Fˆr, r) = R(c)
for r = c.
Proof: For r ∈ [0, v∗), R(Fˆr, r) = R(c), because Fˆr = F ∗ and the reserve price does
not affect the auction. For r ∈ [v∗, m), by the same reasoning as above, R(Fˆr, r) is strictly
decreasing. Finally, R(Fˆv∗ , v
∗) ≤ R(c) because R(Fˆv∗ , v∗) is the revenue under F ∗ when
the good is not sold when all values are equal to v∗ while R(c) is the revenue under F ∗
when the good is sold for v∗ when all values are equal to v∗. 
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Now, because by propositions 2 and 3, R(Fˆr, r) ≤ R(c) for all r and because distribu-
tions Fˆr are feasible to Nature, we conclude that R(r) ≤ R(Fˆr, r) ≤ R(c) for all r, which
finishes the proof of theorem 1.
3.3 Uniqueness
Theorem 1 establishes that c is a maxmin reserve price. But are there other maxmin
prices?
Proposition 4. Suppose the seller knows the mean of value distribution m and an upper
bound on values v. Then:
1. If v∗ < c (equivalently, (n− 1)2 < v−c
m−c
), c is the unique maxmin reserve price;
2. If v∗ ≥ c (equivalently, (n − 1)2 ≥ v−c
m−c
), all prices r ∈ [0, c] are maxmin reserve
prices.
Proof: Part 1 follows directly from proposition 2. To prove part 2, we show that
F ∗, the distribution identified by proposition 1, part 2, is a worst-case distribution not
only for r = c, but for all r ∈ [0, c) as well. Indeed, if r < c, the expected revenue may be
written as
R(F, r) = r − c+ (c− r)F n(r) +R(F, c).
F ∗ minimizes R(F, c), but it also minimizes (c−r)F n(r) because c−r > 0 and F ∗(r) = 0,
as r < c ≤ v∗. Thus, it minimizes the sum of these two terms. 
As discussed in the introduction, proposition 4, part 2, might weakly explain why
sometimes reserve prices lower than seller’s valuation are observed in real-life auctions.
By using the qualifier “weakly” we emphasize the caveat that all prices below c are weakly
dominated by c (yield weakly lower revenue for any fixed distribution) and thus might be
refined away despite being worst-case optimal.
Note, however, that proposition 4, part 2, does not say that prices r ∈ [0, c] are the
only maxmin prices. Indeed, in the previous version of this paper (Suzdaltsev, 2018) we
show that when the maxmin price is not unique, the set of maxmin prices may also include
some prices higher than c. As noted above, the full characterization of the set of maxmin
prices by backward induction requires subtler analysis that is beyond the scope of this
paper.
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4 Known mean and upper bound on variance
4.1 The result
In this section, we consider the problem (1) for ∆ = ∆2(m, σ
2), that is, consider a situation
in which seller knows the mean and an upper bound for variance of value distribution.
Again, it has been shown that if n = 1, there exists a unique maxmin price that exceeds
seller’s costs (see Azar and Micali (2013) and Carrasco et al. (2018a)). In contrast, we
show that if n ≥ 2, the seller can do no better than to set the reserve price to her costs.
Theorem 2 (Main result II). Suppose the seller knows the mean of value distribution
m and an upper bound on its variance σ2. Then, the set of prices r∗ solving problem (1)
includes seller’s valuation c.
4.2 The proof
The plan of proof is exactly the same as in the section 3.
4.2.1 First step
Suppose r = c. As compared with (3), Nature’s problem now involves one more constraint.
To write it in an integral form, note that, for a nonnegative random variable v with cdf
F (·), E(v2) = ∫∞
0
(1 − F (√s))ds = ∫∞
0
2v(1 − F (v))dv. Hence, the additional constraint
is
∫∞
0
2v(1− F (v))dv ≤ m2 + σ2.
Thus, the new Nature’s problem is:
min
F (·)
(
c+
∫ ∞
c
(
1− nF n−1(v) + (n− 1)F n(v)) dv) (13)
s.t.
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (v))dv = m (14)∫ ∞
0
2v(1− F (v))dv ≤ m2 + σ2 (15)
F (v) ∈ [0, 1] for all v ∈ [0,∞) (16)
F (v) is nondecreasing, right-continuous (17)
lim
v→∞
F (v) = 1 (18)
Together, constraints (14) and (15) ensure that the mean of F (·) is equal to m, and its
variance is no more than σ2. The constraints (17), (18) ensure that F (·) is a cdf.
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Again, before proceeding to a Lagrangian, we show that Nature can restrict itself to
distributions putting no mass below c.
Lemma 4. For every feasible cdf F in problem (13)-(18), there exists a feasible cdf F˜
putting no mass below c such that the expected revenue (13) is weakly lower under F˜ than
under F .
Proof of lemma 4: The proof is the same as the proof of lemma 1. The only
difference is that one has to show that F˜ , as constructed in the proof of lemma 1, satisfies
the variance constraint (15). But this is true because F is a mean-preserving spread of
F˜ , as
∫ v
0
F (v)dv ≥ ∫ v
0
F˜ (v)dv and their means are the same. 
Lemma 4 allows to rewrite mean and variance constraints as (8) and
∫ ∞
c
2v(1− F (v))dv ≤ m2 + σ2 − c2. (19)
Define the Lagrangian by
L(F, λ1, λ2) =
∫ ∞
c
(
1 + λ1 + 2tλ2 − nF n−1(v) + (n− 1)F n(v)− (λ1 + 2λ2v)F (v)
)
dv
(20)
The sufficiency of the pointwise minimization of the Lagrangian is now slightly subtler
as now we have an inequality constraint. It can be ensured if λ2 has the right sign and a
candidate worst-case distribution F0 satisfies (19) with equality.
Lemma 5. If F0 is any cdf such that (1) F0 minimizes the Lagrangian among all cdfs for
some λ2 ≥ 0, λ1 of any sign; (2) F0 satisfies (8) and satisfies (19) with equality, then F0
solves the problem (13)-(18).
Proof: Take any cdf F˜ satisfying constraints (8)-(19). We shall prove that R(F0, c) ≤
R(F˜ , c) for any F0 satisfying conditions in the lemma. Because F0 minimizes the La-
grangian,
L(F0, λ1, λ2) ≤ L(F˜ , λ1, λ2).
Because both F0 and F˜ satisfy (8),
−λ1
∫ ∞
c
(1− F0(v))dv = −λ1
∫ ∞
c
(1− F˜ (v))dv.
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Because F0 satisfies (19) with equality, F˜ satisfies (19), and λ2 ≥ 0,
−λ2
∫ ∞
c
2v(1− F0(v))dv = −λ2(m2 + σ2 − c2) ≤ −λ2
∫ ∞
c
2v(1− F˜ (v))dv.
Summing up the above relations, one gets
∫ ∞
c
(
1− nF n−10 (v) + (n− 1)F n0 (v)
)
dv ≤
∫ ∞
c
(
1− nF˜ n−1(v) + (n− 1)F˜ n(v)
)
dv,
or R(F0, c) ≤ R(F˜ , c). 
Recall that z(y) = yn−1 − yn−2 and define
φ(q) :=
∫ 1
q
(z(y)− z(q))2dy(∫ 1
q
(z(y)− z(q))dy
)2 (21)
for q ∈ (0, 1).
Recall from section 3 that q∗n = 1− 1(n−1)2 . Now define
v∗∗ := max
{
m− σ√
φ(q∗n)− 1
, 0
}
. (22)
Analogously to section 3, v∗∗ will be shown to be the lowest point in support of the
worst-case distribution if c = r = 0.
We now introduce the family of distributions that plays a major role in both steps of
the proof of theorem 2. The shape of the distribution is dictated by the minimization of
Lagrangian when r = c. Given a parameter ρ ∈ [v∗∗, m) define a cdf Gρ(·) as follows:
Gρ(v) = 0 for v < ρ; Gρ(ρ) ≡ q(ρ) and
G−1ρ (q) =
n(n− 1)z(q)− λ1(ρ)
2λ2(ρ)
(23)
for q ∈ [q(ρ), 1] where λ1(ρ), λ2(ρ) are parameters attuned in such a way that mean and
variance constraints hold as equalities.
Equivalently, for every v ≥ ρ, Gρ(v) = min{y¯(λ1(ρ) + 2λ2(ρ)v), 1} where y¯(λ) is the
larger solution to (10) (as in (11)).
To proceed, one must first check that Gρ are well-defined.
Lemma 6. Gρ is well-defined, i.e. for each ρ ∈ [v∗∗, m), there exists a unique triple
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q∗3 =
3
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v∗∗
Figure 4: A graph of a typical cdf from the Gρ family for n = 3. In the picture, ρ = v
∗∗,
so the depicted cdf is worst-case if r = c < v∗∗.
(λ1(ρ), λ2(ρ), q(ρ)), λ1(ρ) < 0, λ2(ρ) > 0, q(ρ) ∈ [q∗n, 1) such that Gρ has mean m and
variance σ2.
The proofs of lemma 6 and subsequent lemmata is relegated to the Appendix. The
analysis is enabled by the fact that one can write the mean and variance constraints
(14),(15) as closed-form functions of λ1, λ2 and q, even though there is no closed-form
solution for Gρ. This is possible since the respective integrals may be rewritten as integrals
of the quantile function G−1(q).
Note that if v∗∗ > 0, Gv∗∗(v
∗∗) ≡ q(v∗∗) = q∗n. We now establish the worst-case
distribution if r = c.
Proposition 5. Suppose r = c. Then, the distribution Gmax{v∗∗,c} solves the problem
(13)-(18).
Proof of proposition 5: By lemma 5, it suffices to prove that Gmax{v∗∗,c} minimizes
the Lagrangian pointwise.
Suppose first that c < v∗∗ so v∗∗ > 0. Then Gv∗∗(v
∗∗) = q∗n. Take λ1 and λ2 as
coming from the definition of Gv∗∗ (numbers that make Gv∗∗ satisfy the mean and variance
constraints as equalities). We have λ1 + 2λ2v
∗∗ = n(n − 1)z(q∗n). Then it follows from
lemma 3 (with λ1 + 2λ2v playing the role of λ) that Gv∗∗ minimizes the Lagrangian
pointwise under the multipliers λ1 and λ2.
Now suppose c ≥ v∗∗. Take λ1 and λ2 as coming from the definition of Gc. Then
it again follows from lemma 3 that Gc minimizes the Lagrangian pointwise under the
multipliers λ1 and λ2. 
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4.2.2 Second step
r
R
mc
A
r
R
v∗∗
A
mc
Figure 5: Proof idea. The curves are graphs of R(Fˆr, r). The graph of the worst-case
revenue function R(r) must lie everywhere weakly below the depicted curve by Step 2
and must pass through the point A by Step 1. m = σ2 = 1; c = 0; n = 2 (left), n = 3
(right). If n = 2, σ/m = 1 corresponds to “high” variance, and r∗ = 0 has to be the
unique maxmin price. If n = 3, σ/m = 1 corresponds to “low” variance, and r∗ = 0 might
not be the unqiue maxmin price.
Analogously to section 3, for every r we construct a feasible distribution Fˆr such that
R(Fˆr, r) ≤ R(c) for all r. This implies theorem 2.
As in section 3, the construction of threat distributions Fˆr depends on whether c > v
∗∗
or c ≤ v∗∗; equivalently, whether variance σ2 is high or low.
Case 1 (High Variance). c > v∗∗. Define threat distributions Fˆr by
Fˆr :=


Gv∗∗ , r ∈ [0, v∗∗);
Gr+, r ∈ [v∗∗, c);
Gr, r ∈ [c,m);
δm, r ≥ m,
Gv∗∗ is the same as the worst-case distribution F
∗ when r = c = 0.
Recall that q(r) ≡ Gr(r), the size of the atom of Gr at r, and λ1(r), λ2(r) are param-
eters of Gr (see (23)). In the next lemma, we derive closed-form expression for R(Fˆr, r)
in terms of λ1(r), λ2(r), q(r) is available, even though there is no closed-form solution for
(λ1(r), λ2(r), q(r)) themselves.
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Lemma 7. For r ≥ v∗∗,
R(Gr, r) = |λ1(r)|(m− q(r)r)−2λ2(r)(m2+σ2− q(r)r2)−nz(q(r))rq(r)+ c · qn(r). (24)
Next, we show that the full derivative dR(Gr ,r)
dr
also admits a tractable expression. (If Gr
were worst-case distributions, this derivative would be computable by a suitable version
of envelope theorem; but they are not.)
Lemma 8. For r ≥ v∗∗,
dR(Gr, r)
dr
= n(n− 2)qz − nqn−1q′(r − c).
Now we are ready to state the key proposition. Recall that q(r) satisfies φ(q(r)) =
1+ σ
2
(m−r)2
. Because φ′(q) > 0 (shown in the proof of lemma 6) and d(σ2/(m−r)2)/dr > 0,
by implicit function theorem q(r) is a differentiable function with q′(r) > 0.
Proposition 6. Suppose c > v∗∗. Then, R(Fˆr, r) < R(c) for all r 6= c and R(Fˆr, r) = R(c)
for r = c.
Proof: The fact that R(Fˆr, r) = R(c) for r = c is obvious since Fˆc is a worst-case
distribution for r = c, as identified by proposition 5.
As z < 0, q′ > 0, by (35) we have R′ < 0 for r ≥ c unless n = 2 and r = c in which case
R′ = 0. Thus, R(Fˆr, r) is strictly decreasing on [c,m) and R(Fˆr, r) < R(c) for r ∈ (c,m).
For r ≥ m, R(Fˆr, r) = c, but c = lim
r→m−
R(Fˆr, r). Thus, c < R(c).
Consider now r ∈ [v∗∗, c). R(Fˆr, r) = R(Gr+ , r) differs from R(Gr, r) only by term
(r − c)qn(r) since there is a sale if v(1) = r+ but not if v(1) = r. Thus, when r ∈ [v∗∗, c),
we get
dR(Fˆr, r)
dr
= n(n− 2)qz − nqn−1q′ · (r − c) + [(r − c)qn]′ = qn−1((n− 1)2q − n(n− 2)).
For r > v∗∗, q(r) > q∗n, and for r = v
∗∗, q(r) = q∗n. Thus, the above derivative is zero at
r = v∗∗ and positive at r ∈ (v∗∗, c). Thus, R(Fˆr, r) is strictly increasing on [v∗∗, c), which
implies that R(Fˆr, r) < R(c) for r ∈ [v∗∗, c).
Finally, because R(Fˆr, r) < R(c) for r = v
∗∗, this is true for r < v∗∗ as well. 
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Case 2 (Low Variance). c ≤ v∗∗. Define threat distributions Fˆr by
Fˆr :=


Gv∗∗ , r ∈ [0, v∗∗);
Gr, r ∈ [v∗∗, m);
δm, r ≥ m,
The proof that R(Fˆr, r) ≤ R(c) is exactly the same as the proof of proposition 3, with
v∗ replaced by v∗∗.
Now, because by the above analysis R(Fˆr, r) ≤ R(c) for all r and because distributions
Fˆr are feasible to Nature, we conclude that R(r) ≤ R(Fˆr, r) ≤ R(c) for all r, which finishes
the proof of theorem 2.
4.3 Uniqueness
Analogously to proposition 4, we establish the following:
Proposition 7. Suppose the seller knows the mean of value distribution m and an upper
bound on variance σ2. Then:
1. (High variance case.) If c > v∗∗, c is the unique maxmin reserve price;
2. (Low variance case.) If c ≤ v∗∗, all prices r ∈ [0, c] are maxmin reserve prices.
The proof of proposition 7 is identical to the proof of proposition 4. Note that the
condition c ≤ v∗∗ can be alternatively viewed as variance is small enough or the number of
bidders is high enough. As in section 3, part 2 of proposition 7 might weakly explain why
reserve price substantially lower than c are observed in practice. Unlike the case in section
3, in the case of known bound on variance we are not aware of the full characterization
of the set of maxmin reserve prices.
4.4 Example: n = 2
In case of two bidders, closed-form expressions for threat distributions Fˆr are available.
As z(q) = q − 1 for n = 2, by (23), G−1(q) is a linear function wherever it is defined and
thus distributions Gr are mixtures of an atom at r with a uniform distribution. The same
applies to the worst-case distribution F ∗ when r = c.
For n = 2, v∗∗ = max{m−√3σ, 0}. m−√3σ is simply the lowest point in the support
of a uniform distribution with mean m and variance σ2.
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Suppose m − √3σ ≥ 0, so v∗∗ = m − √3σ. There are two cases: c ≤ m − √3σ and
c > m −√3σ. In the first case, which corresponds to either low seller’s valuation or low
variance, the worst-case distribution for r = c is simply uniform on [m−√3σ,m+√3σ]
and the maxmin revenue is
R∗2 = m−
√
3
3
σ. (25)
Nature’s threats work as follows. For all r ∈ [0, m − √3σ], Nature can use this
uniform distribution and induce the same revenue (and this distribution is still worst-case
for r ∈ [0, c] as shown in the proof of proposition 7). For r ∈ (m−√3σ,m), Nature may
use a distribution Gr that has an atom of
q(r) =
σ2 − (m− r)2/3
σ2 + (m− r)2
on r and is uniform on (r, b(r)] where
b(r) =
1
2
(3m− r) + 3
2
σ2
m− r .
Note that b(r) grows without bound when r → m; the fact that there is no upper bound
on values is important. For r ≥ m, Nature puts all mass on m.
If c > m−√3σ (either high seller’s valuation or high variance), the worst-case distri-
bution for r = c is Gc itself. For r ∈ [0, m−
√
3σ], Nature may use uniform distribution
on [m−√3σ,m+√3σ], for r ∈ (m−√3σ, c) it may use Gr+ , while for r ∈ (c,m) it again
may use Gr.
When n = 2, we can illustrate the fact that threat distributions Fˆr are generally not
worst-case distributions. For instance, suppose c = 0, m = σ2 = 1, n = 2 (Figure 5, left)
and r = 0.5. Then Fˆr is is such that vi is distributed uniformly on [0.5, 4.25] with prob.
4
15
and equal to 0.5 with prob. 11
15
. Expected revenue under Fˆr is 0.32. However, if Nature
uses a distribution which is a mixture of δ0.5 and uniform distribution on [2.5, b] (where b
and the size of the atom are pinned down by moments constraints), the expected revenue
is approximately 0.2767 < 0.32. Numerically, all worst-case distributions have similar
gaps in support and are intractable analytically even for n = 2.
4.5 A formula for maxmin revenue
It may be shown that in the low variance case the formula for maxmin revenue has the
same simple form as in (25). Indeed, in the low variance case all prices in [0, c] are maxmin,
24
and the maxmin revenue is equal to that under the price v∗∗, as if there were sale when
v(1) = r. Thus, replacing c with r, plugging r = v
∗∗ in (24), and then getting rid of λ1
and λ2 using (30)-(32), one gets that
R∗n = m− γnσ, (26)
where γn depends only on n (in the proof of proposition 8 we give a formula for γn in
terms of φ(q∗n)). Thus, the worst-case revenue is simply the mean minus a penalty linear
in the standard deviation. However, the values of the penalties γn are rather unexpected.
For instance 4,
R∗3 = m−
√
470
80
σ ≈ m− 0.271σ
R∗4 = m−
√
21604695
25515
σ ≈ m− 0.182σ
R∗5 = m−
√
8995616791
688128
σ ≈ m− 0.138σ.
Note that the maxmin revenue is strictly decreasing in variance. This is expected for
n = 2 when the second order statistic is the minimal value, whose expectation is naturally
below m and so higher variance reduces it. For higher n, the expectation of the second
order statistic can be well above m and so larger variance may naturally increase rather
than decrease it. The resolution to this paradox is that Nature chooses highly skewed
distributions such that Ev(2) is below Evi = m for any n. We expect the solution to be
substantially different, with variance constraint not binding, when Nature is allowed to
choose only from symmetric distributions for n ≥ 3.
5 Large number of bidders
5.1 Asymptotically optimal mechanism
Throughout the paper, we have considered only the issue of optimal reserve price but not
the issue of optimal mechanism. This more general question seems to be poorly tractable
for a fixed n. One reason for that is that the set of joint distributions of values feasible
to Nature is not convex due to independence constraint (a convex combination of two
factorizable functions is not in general factorizable), and thus the strong duality approach
4Taking σ/m ≤ √4.7 is enough for variance to be “low” if c = 0.
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employed by Suzdaltsev (2020) is not applicable.
However, it is possible to establish that the second-price auction with a maxmin reserve
price (e.g. r∗ = c) is asymptotically a maxmin mechanism (among all interim individually
rational mechanisms).
Namely, denote by Rn(r
∗) is the revenue guarantee of the maxmin reserve price, iden-
tified in this paper (e.g., of r∗ = c). Denote by Rn(M
∗) the revenue guarantee of the best
(possibly randomized) mechanism. Then, we have the following:
Proposition 8. For both settings (∆ = ∆(m, v) and ∆ = ∆(m, σ2)), for any ε > 0, there
exists N such that for all n > N , Rn(r
∗) > Rn(M
∗)− ε
Proof: Note that expected revenue of any (individually rational) mechanism is no
more than expected total surplus; but the worst-case expected total surplus is not more
than m because Nature can always choose F = δm. (This argument is standard and is
used in Koc¸yig˘it et al. (2020) and He and Li (2020).)
It remains to show than Rn(r
∗) converges to m as n→∞. For ∆ = ∆(m, v), we have
for all sufficiently high n
R∗n = m− αn(v −m),
where
αn =
n
n− 1
(
1− 1
(n− 1)2
)n−2
− 1.
The fact that αn converges to zero stems from the fact that
(
1− 1
(n−1)2
)n−2
∼ exp(−1/n)
as n→∞.
For ∆ = ∆(m, σ2), we have for all sufficiently high n
R∗n = m− γnσ,
where it follows from (30)-(24) that
γn = αn
√
(n− 1)2ψ(q∗n)− 1, (27)
where ψ(q) = φ(q)(1 − q) (see the proof of lemma 6). As ψ is bounded, to prove that
γn → 0 one has to prove that nαn → 0 as n→∞. In fact, one may show that
lim
n→∞
n2αn =
1
2
. (28)
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Indeed,
n2αn ∼ n2n(exp(−1/n)− 1) + 1
n− 1 .
Then the result follows from a second-order expansion of exp(−1/n). 
5.2 Comparing rates of convergence
How does the seller’s maxmin revenue compare in the two settings we have considered in
this paper? The revenue obviously depends on the particular values of the upper bounds.
However, noting that in both cases revenue converges to the mean m as the number of
bidders tends to infinity we can still get a meaningful comparison by comparing the rates
of convergence. This will compare the “strength” of Nature in two cases. We also bring
into the picture the case of correlated private values, studied by Koc¸yig˘it et al. (2020)
and Suzdaltsev (2020) (maxmin reserve price is again c in this case for all n sufficiently
large).
According to results in Koc¸yig˘it et al. (2020) and Suzdaltsev (2020), when mean m
and upper bound on values v are known, and values can be arbitrarily correlated,
Rn(r
∗) = m− v −m
n− 1 (29)
for all n sufficiently large.
Thus, from (27), (28) and (29) one may make the following
Observation.
• When mean m and upper bound on values v are known, and values are iid,
m−R∗n = Θ
(
1
n2
)
as n→∞;
• When mean m and upper bound on variance σ2 are known and values are iid,
m−R∗n = Θ
(
1
n
)
as n→∞;
• When meanm and upper bound on values v are known, and values can be arbitrarily
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correlated,
m−R∗n = Θ
(
1
n
)
as n→∞.
Thus, starting with the first setting in which mean m and upper bound on values v
are known and values are iid, replacing an upper bound on values with an upper bound
on variance has a similar (adverse) effect on revenue as allowing arbitrary correlation in
values. This suggests that an upper bound on values is a much more stringent constraint
on Nature than an upper bound on variance. This is perhaps not surprising in hindsight:
a bound on values implies a bound on variance, but not vice versa.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that a seller who (1) faces multiple bidders and conducts a
second-price auction with a reserve; (2) possesses only basic information about value dis-
tribution; (3) employs a worst-case perspective can do no better than to set a reserve equal
to her own valuation. This result adds to an emerging theme in the current robustness
literature: a worst-case perspective is associated with low reserve prices.
One may think of several extensions of the present results.
• First-price auctions. We presented an analysis for a second-price auction. A
problem with extending results for first-price auctions by revenue-equivalence is
that to ensure that a classic pure-strategy Bayesian equilibrium exists, one must
constrain Nature to use atomless distributions only, but the worst-case and threat
distributions we used throughout the paper do contain atoms. However, the analysis
still goes through as these special distributions can be approximated by a sequence
of continuous distributions such that the value of revenue is the same in the limit.
For example, it can be done by replacing each atom with uniform distributions on
an interval below it and then tweaking the overall distribution a little in such a way
that Nature’s constraints hold. Thus, in a first-price auction the seller can still do
no better than to set a reserve equal to her own valuation.
• Exactly known variance. We stated the results in section 4 for the case of a
known upper bound on variance. However, if the variance is known exactly, the
results still hold. First, even though if variance is known exactly the set of feasible
distributions is not compact (as noted by Carrasco et al. (2018a)), the infimum
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in Nature’s problem is well-defined. Second, for r < m all worst-case and threat
distributions we consider are such that the variance constraint binds. Third, for
r ≥ m instead of m one can consider a sequence of distributions Gm−1/k defined
in section 4. Along this sequence, the probability of no sale converges to one and
moments constraints are satisfied with equality.
• A randomized reserve. We have limited ourselves to the case of a deterministic
reserve price. It is natural to expect that, as is common for maxmin problems,
a randomized reserve will yield a strictly higher revenue guarantee by allowing the
seller to hedge bets. This is an interesting direction for further research. A challenge
is that it is unclear how to use a duality approach, as in and Che (2019) and
He and Li (2020), under the independence constraint faced by Nature. A conjecture
is that a saddle point does not exist if Nature is allowed to use only pure strategies
(product distributions) but not mixed strategies (mixtures of product distributions).
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Appendix
Proof of lemma 6: Fortunately, one can write constraints (14),(15) as closed-form
functions of λ1, λ2 and q, even though there is no closed-form solution for Gρ. This is
possible since the respective integrals may be rewritten as integrals of the quantile function
G−1(q). Indeed, one gets the following system of three equations with three unknowns
(λ1, λ2, q):
q(ρ)ρ+
∫ 1
q(ρ)
n(n− 1)z(q)− λ1(ρ)
2λ2(ρ)
dq = m
q(r)ρ2 +
∫ 1
q(ρ)
[
n(n− 1)z(q)− λ1(ρ)
2λ2(ρ)
]2
dq = m2 + σ2.
λ1(ρ) + 2λ2(ρ)ρ = n(n− 1)z(q(ρ)). (30)
(The first two equations stem from the mean and variance constraints (14),(15) while
the third is (23), written for q = q(ρ).) Getting rid of λ1(ρ), one simplifies the first two
equations to
n(n− 1)
∫ 1
q(ρ)
(z(q)− z(q(ρ)))dq = 2λ2(ρ)(m− ρ) (31)
(n(n− 1))2
∫ 1
q(ρ)
(z(q)− z(q(ρ)))2dq = (2λ2(ρ))2((m− ρ)2 + σ2). (32)
Equations (31)-(32) may be collapsed to
φ(q(ρ)) = 1 +
σ2
(m− ρ)2 , (33)
where φ(q) is as defined in (21). We now show that for every ρ ∈ [v∗∗, m) equation (33)
admits a unique solution q(ρ) ∈ [q∗n, 1). To this end, we prove that φ′(q) > 0 for q ∈ [q∗n, 1)
and that lim
q→1
φ(q) = +∞.
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First, by direct computation, φ′(q) is proportional to
z′(q) ·

∫ 1q (z(y)− z(q))2dy
1− q −
(∫ 1
q
(z(y)− z(q))dy
1− q
)2 .
z′(q) > 0 for q ≥ q∗n and the expression in parentheses is positive because it equals the
variance of random variable z(Y )−z(q) where random variable Y is distributed uniformly
on [q, 1]. Thus, φ′(q) > 0.
Now, φ(q) = ψ(q)/(1 − q) where ψ(q) is the ratio of mean of square to the square of
mean of random variable z(Y )− z(q). Thus, ψ(q) > 1 for all q < 1, so lim
q→1
φ(q) = +∞.
It follows from the definition of v∗∗ that for every ρ ∈ [v∗∗, m), φ(q∗n) ≤ 1 + σ
2
(m−ρ)2
; we
also have lim
q→1
φ(q) = +∞ > 1+ σ2
(m−ρ)2
. Because φ(q) is continuous and strictly increasing,
there exists a unique q(ρ) ∈ [q∗n, 1) solving (33).
The uniqueness and signs of λ1(ρ), λ2(ρ) follow from (31) and (30). 
Proof of lemma 7: Note that Gr has an atom at r and a density gr for v > r.
Because there is no sale when v(1) = r,
R(Gr, r) = E(v(2)1{v(2)>r}) + r · n(1− q(r))qn−1(r) + cqn(r) =
=
∫ ∞
r
v · n(n− 1)(Gn−2r (v)−Gn−1r (v))gr(v)dv − nz(q(r))rq(r) + cqn(r). (34)
From (23), one deduces that gr(v) =
2λ2(r)
n(n−1)z′(Gr(v))
. Thus,
E(v(2)1{v(2)>r}) =
∫ ∞
r
2λ2(r)v
−z(Gr(v))
z′(Gr(v))
dv.
Plugging v = G−1r (q) and using (23) again, one gets
E(v(2)1{v(2)>r}) = −
∫ 1
q(r)
n(n− 1)z(q)n(n− 1)z(q)− λ1(r)
2λ2(r)
dq.
Mean and variance constraints read as
q(r)r +
∫ 1
q(r)
n(n− 1)z(q)− λ1(r)
2λ2(r)
dq = m
q(r)r2 +
∫ 1
q(r)
[
n(n− 1)z(q)− λ1(r)
2λ2(r)
]2
dq = m2 + σ2.
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Then, the fact that E(v(2)1{v(2)>r}) = −λ1(r)(m − q(r)r) − 2λ2(r)(m2 + σ2 − q(r)r2)
stems directly from the last three equations. The formula for revenue then follows. 
Proof of lemma 8: Now consider the derivative of R˜(r) := E(v(2)1{v(2)>r}) =
−λ1(r)(m − q(r)r) − 2λ2(r)(m2 + σ2 − q(r)r2). We omit arguments of functions for
brevity. From (30), we get that
R˜ = 2λ2r(r −m)− 2λ2((m− r)2 + σ2)− n(n− 1)zm+ n(n− 1)qrz.
R˜′ = [2λ2(r−m)]′r + 2λ2(m− r)− 2λ′2((m− r)2 + σ2)− n(n− 1)z′q′m+ n(n− 1)(qrz)′.
Using both (31) and the differentiated version of (31), one gets
R˜′ = n(n− 1)((qr)′z − (m− r)z′q′) + n(n− 1)
∫ 1
q
(z(x)− z(q))dx− 2λ′2((m− r)2 + σ2).
However, differentiating (32) one gets
λ′2((m− r)2 + σ2) = −n2(n− 1)2
q′z′
∫ 1
q
(z(x)− z(q))dx
4λ2
+ λ2(m− r),
which, using (31) again, is equivalent to
2λ′2((m− r)2 + σ2) = n(n− 1)
[
−q′z′(m− r) +
∫ 1
q
(z(x)− z(q))dx
]
.
Thus,
R˜′ = n(n− 1)(qr)′z.
Because R = R˜ − nzqr + cqn, we get
R′ = n(n− 1)(qr)′z − nqrz′q′ − n(qr)′z = n(n− 2)(qr)′z − nqrz′q′ + nqn−1q′c.
Since qz′ = (n− 2)z + qn−1, after simplifications we finally get
R′ = n(n− 2)qz − nqn−1q′(r − c). (35)

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